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Tim Williamson has been criticised by some readers, such as P.M.S.Hacker (2009) and H.J. Glock (2010), for not spelling out what hemeans by ‘conceptual analysis’ or ‘conceptual investigation’ - what
he takes philosophy not to be. This doesn’t seem entirely fair:
Williamson does say that a conceptual investigation is a study of concepts
-e.g. of the concept of knowledge, as opposed to knowledge itself- and he
gives examples of philosophical investigations that he regards as concep-
tual, such as research in philosophy of science about ‘what biologists’
and physicists’ concepts are or should be’, or ‘what those concepts are
concepts of’ (PoP, p.18). I take it that he would also regard Chris
Peacocke’s, Jerry Fodor’s, and Jesse Prinz’s work on what concepts (in
general) are as examples of conceptual investigations in the same sense.
On the other hand, it is true that Williamson doesn’t do much to clarify
the prima facie different sense of ‘conceptual analysis’ in which much of
philosophy could be considered (and was indeed considered, and is still
considered by many) to be conceptual analysis: e.g. what did the linguis-
tic/conceptual philosophers have in mind when they claimed that all or
most philosophical investigations are conceptual investigations. More
accurately: Williamson assumes that for such philosophers, philosophy
was (is) the search for conceptual truths; he then quickly identifies con-
ceptual truth with analytic truth (PoP, p.50), and proceeds to challenge
both the thesis that allegedly analytic truths are insubstantial and the very
notion of analytic truth. From a theoretical viewpoint, Williamson’s
polemical target is sufficiently well defined; but from a historical view-
point it is somewhat out of focus. The idea that philosophy is an attempt
at establishing analytic truths -truths such as are expressed by ‘Rectangles
have four sides’ or ‘Groundhogs are woodchucks’ - is not easily reconciled
with our picture of what Wittgenstein, Ryle, or Strawson were up to. Of
course, Williamson could retort that those philosophers professed to be
doing conceptual analysis but really were not. However, such a claim
ought to be substantiated by some alternative description of their work,
which Williamson’s book clearly does not aim to provide. 
In what follows, I shall try to describe one view of philosophy as con-
ceptual inquiry (namely Wittgenstein’s, as I happen to know it better than
 
other similar views) and to point out differences between such a concep-
tion of philosophy and the conception defended by Williamson in The
Philosophy of Philosophy. I shall argue for the following three claims:
1. Wittgenstein’s view that philosophical investigations are conceptual
investigations derives from his conception of necessity;
2. Williamson does not argue against Wittgenstein’s conception of neces-
sity: he simply takes it for granted that it is misguided;
3. Williamson’s arguments against the thesis that philosophy is conceptual
analysis do not have much bite against Wittgenstein’s conception.
For lack of space, I shall not try to show that Williamson’s arguments
do not apply to Wittgenstein’s conception. I refer the reader to the litera-
ture that has tried to show that Wittgenstein’s grammatical ‘propositions’
are not to be identified with the analytic propositions (e.g. Baker &
Hacker 1985; Andronico 2007), even though it has been argued that the
two sets have a non-empty intersection (Schroeder 2009,102-105). Be that
as it may, it remains that Williamson’s arguments are not directly aimed
at the core of Wittgenstein’s conception. Briefly put: if Wittgenstein is
right about necessity, it is hard to see how philosophy could be other than
conceptual analysis (in Wittgenstein’s sense, which is not exactly
Williamson’s). Williamson does not argue against Wittgenstein’s concep-
tion of necessity but simply assumes it to be wrong. Consequently, on
the one hand, the view that Williamson refutes (if he does refute it) is not
exactly Wittgenstein’s view; on the other hand, Williamson does not chal-
lenge Wittgenstein’s arguments for his conception of philosophy, as he
does not deal with them at all.
For Wittgenstein, conceptual inquiry does not lead to conceptual truths,
i.e. to true propositions about concepts; it leads to the discovery of rules
that set connections among concepts. Such connections are called ‘gram-
matical’ because the rules that establish them are similar to rules of gram-
mar, such as ‘Medial verbs do not allow manner adverbials’ or ‘The pas-
sivization marker is SV-internal’ . An example of such grammatical
connections is the connection between the notion of knowledge and the
notion of truth that we express by saying such things as ‘Knowledge
entails truth’, or ‘Propositions that are known are true’ (OC, 415).
Wittgenstein, however, regards these common formulations as mislead-
ing, for they present as descriptions of facts what are in fact rules for the
use of language. ‘Propositions that are known are true’ looks like ‘In
macaques, mirror neurons are found in the pre-frontal cortex’. However,
while some mirror neurons, or even all mirror neurons might not be in
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the macaques’ prefrontal cortex, a proposition that is known could not fail
to be true. Truly factual propositions are singled out by their contingency:
that a proposition is not factual, i.e. -for Wittgenstein- that it is not a
genuine proposition can be seen from the fact that, if it were a proposi-
tion, it would turn out to be a necessary proposition - a proposition that
could not be false. However, there are no necessary propositions: if a
proposition were necessary, its negation would describe an impossibility.
But impossibilities cannot be meaningfully described, hence necessities
cannot be meaningfully described either (if p, a proposition that describes
a necessity, were meaningful then ~p, the description of an impossibility,
would be meaningful as well).1
Thus, ‘propositions’ such as ‘Propositions that are known are true’ are
quite different from ‘Mirror neurons are found in the macaques’ pre-frontal
cortex’; in fact, they are not propositions at all. Rather, they are mislead-
ing formulations of rules; in this case, of one of the rules that govern our
use of the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ (or, as Wittgenstein would also
say, our application of the concepts of knowledge and truth): rules such as
‘Call a proposition ‘a piece of knowledge’ only if you are prepared to call
it a truth’, or ‘Only apply the concept of knowledge to contents to which
you are prepared to apply the concept of truth’. 
Such results of philosophical inquiry can be presented as norms for the
use of concepts. However, this could suggest that philosophical inquiry
discovers norms in the sense in which we might come to establish (dis-
cover) that one ought not to kill, or that one ought to nurse the old rather
than suppress them. This is not what Wittgenstein had in mind:
Wittgenstein did not think that we come to establish that knowledge
entails truth by way of some valid argument based on true premises. What
we discover is a fact: we discover that some norm is in force within a cer-
tain community (usually, our own community). It then seems that phi-
losophy is a kind of anthropology: indeed, Wittgenstein himself pointed
out the analogy (e.g. BT, XII, 90, VB, 75). Philosophy makes us aware
of the norms that regulate certain practices of our community: in this
sense it is a kind of anthropology. However, this is just one side of philo-
sophical inquiry. The other side is highlighted when we come to consider
that the community we are talking about is our own community, so that
1 The argument can be reconstructed from bits and pieces in the Tractatus (see
Marconi 2010). The later Wittgenstein stuck with the idea that if it is incon-
ceivable that ~p, then it is inconceivable that p as well (PI, 251), though he
admitted that we have an inclination to regard alleged a priori truths (‘This
body has extension’) as obviously true, rather than as nonsensical (PI, 251). 
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the norms that we discover to be in force are binding for us. By discover-
ing that certain norms are in force within our community we discover
how we ought to apply certain concepts and how we ought to use certain
words. As no physical necessity is involved, we of course can -in the
sense of physical possibility- use such words differently; but then, as
Wittgenstein said and Quine repeated after him, we would ‘play another
game’ (PR, 24b), i.e. we would be ‘opting out’ with respect to certain
rule-governed practices that are characteristic of our community. Limited
to that particular aspect, we would no longer belong to our community.
This suggests that such norms are actually obeyed in our community:
if not, deliberately failing to follow them would not entail any ‘opting
out’. Indeed, that’s the way it is: this is why we discover that certain
norms are in force by observing (‘describing’, as Wittgenstein says) how
we as a matter of fact go about doing things: how we (mostly) apply cer-
tain concepts and use certain words. Now, here an obvious methodological
difficulty is lurking (as it has been pointed out many times): it is not
clear whom are we supposed to observe: how many people, for how long,
and which people in particular (so-called ‘experts’? or would anybody
do?). Secondly, it is not clear what exactly are we supposed to observe:
everyday linguistic behaviour in all its casual variety, or rather certain
examples of behaviour that are regarded as representative or ‘paradig-
matic’? Thirdly, passing from the description of behaviour to the singling
out of a norm that such behaviour is regarded as obediently following
may not be trivial: some, like the sceptic Kripkenstein, even believe that
the very same behaviour can be regarded as obeying any among infinitely
many different norms. 
Wittgenstein appears to have thought that all such difficulties could be
overcome: like Austin, he thought that by reflecting on ‘what we would
say when’ we can grasp the norms we go by in our application of con-
cepts, provided we have enough imagination or, as he put it, provided we
don’t follow ‘a one-sided diet’ (PI, 593). Thus we can observe how we as
a matter of fact apply certain concepts and determine how we ought to
apply them (if we are willing to play that particular game, thus belonging
to our community to that extent). Discovering that knowledge entails
truth is discovering that within the practices where words such as ‘know’
and ‘true’ are used, the concepts of knowledge and truth are so applied that
we do not call a propositional content ‘knowledge’ if we do not take it to
be true. The latter formulation, ‘we do not call a propositional content
‘knowledge’ if we do not take it to be true’, can be read both as a descrip-
tion of our linguistic practice and as the statement of a norm, like ‘We do
not eat peas with our hands’: it can be seen as a ‘pushmi-pullyu represen-
tation’ in Millikan’s sense (Millikan 1995), i.e. as both a description and
a prescription.2 Such statements, however, count as prescriptions (as
already noted) only on the presupposition that one belongs, and intends to
keep belonging to a given community (same with peas, for that matter). 
This is, then, more or less what Wittgenstein means by ‘conceptual
investigation’: what philosophy is, in his opinion (Z, 458). For a com-
parison with Williamson’s conception, it is useful to make a distinction
between the characterization of philosophy’s way of doing things and a
characterization of its results. Wittgenstein says that philosophy proceeds
by describing our use of words. This looks quite different from what
Williamson says: he insists that ‘semantic knowledge’ is insufficient to
solve philosophical problems (PoP, 39-40). However, what Williamson
appears to mean here is that the solution of a philosophical problem,
such as the problem of the dryness of Mars, cannot come straight out of
normal semantic competence: though perhaps we could come to the right
answer by ‘reflection of sufficient length and depth on [our] competence’,
such reflective powers cannot plausibly be regarded as part, or a necessary
condition of normal semantic competence. In other words, it cannot be
plausibly claimed that the solution of philosophical problems is directly
generated by such knowledge and abilities as constitute normal semantic
competence (by contrast, a normally competent person knows -pace
Williamson- that stones do not think of Vienna, that bachelors are not
married and that transvestites are not a monastic order). Wittgenstein,
however, would not disagree: the kind of reflection that Wittgenstein has
in mind, which is to a large extent reflection about, or from, one’s own
semantic competence rather than about some particular person’s ‘use of
language’, does not just amount to exercising one’s semantic competence.
As we know from Wittgenstein’s writings, it involves reflection of con-
siderable ‘length and depth’: it includes recourse to thought experiments
and the creation and comparison of many examples; it does not rule out
appeal to scientific results and to logic; and it exercises ordinary reasoning
and, to a vast extent, imagination.3 Thus, the difference between
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2 For a partly different double reading of ‘grammatical propositions’ see
Schroeder 2009, 103, 107.
3 Hence, if the results of a philosophical investigation were true propositions
(as they are not) they would not be epistemologically analytic propositions
in Williamson’s sense, not because rejecting them would be compatible with
normal competence as Williamson has it, but because accepting them would
not immediately and trivially follow from the exercise of such competence. 
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Williamson’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of philosophy is not to be
found in their conceptions of the philosophical ‘method’. Of course, a
vast stylistic gulf divides philosophy as practiced by Williamson from
Wittgensteinian philosophy; however, discriminating prescriptions or pro-
hibitions are not easily singled out. 
The difference is rather to be found, I believe, in how they conceive of
the aims and results of philosophical inquiry. For Williamson, philoso-
phy’s findings concerning (e.g.) the relation between knowledge and truth
are about knowledge and truth, those very entities, whereas for
Wittgenstein they are about the concepts of knowledge and truth; for
Williamson, they are about reality (which includes both knowledge and
truth), whereas for Wittgenstein they are about our language, or our ‘form
of representation’. This opposition stems from their respective views
about necessity. For Wittgenstein, as we saw, necessity does not inhabit
the world: no proposition that has descriptive content is necessary.
Williamson, on the other hand, is convinced -like Kripke and many oth-
ers- that there are essences and necessary properties: for example, it is a
necessary property of pieces of knowledge that they are true. The proposi-
tion expressed by ‘Pieces of knowledge are true’ is a necessary truth about
knowledge, hence about reality.  
That for Wittgenstein necessity does not inhabit the world does not
entail that it inhabits some other place. Wittgenstein reduces necessity to
normativity: saying that bits of knowledge are necessarily true is just an
infelicitous and misleading formulation of the rule ‘Apply the concept of
knowledge to x only if you are prepared to apply the concept of truth to
x’. What looks like a necessary connection between entities is really one
of the norms that govern our thought and language: the müssen is really a
sollen. However, the norm at issue does govern -among other things- our
descriptions of the world: for example, if we are not prepared to describe
the content of some epistemic state as true we shall not describe it as a
state of knowledge.4 In a similar fashion, scientific laws govern our
descriptions of physical phenomena. Now, beginning with the Tractatus
(6.341-6.342) Wittgenstein consistently acknowledged that descriptions
based on different conceptual frameworks (e.g. different though empiri-
cally equivalent theories) are not bound to be fully equivalent from every
viewpoint: some may work better than others (they may simplify certain
practices, allow us to achieve our purposes in less time, etc.). The issue
4 This may be one reason why Wittgenstein says he doesn’t want to talk only
about words (PI, 370), as Hacker recalls to a different purpose (2009,339). 
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then arises of whether our ‘grammar’ -the rules governing our thought and
talk- might not be somewhat responsible to reality: whether reality’s
being such and such might not be a reason or perhaps a cause of our
grammar’s being the network of rules it is. In Wittgensteinian philology,
this issue is called ‘the problem of the arbitrariness of grammar’.5 It is
well known that the greatest concession that Wittgensteinian grammar
made to the world consisted in granting that if the world had been different
-if certain ‘very general facts of nature’ had been different- it would proba-
bly have looked natural to us to think differently: different concepts might
have looked natural to us (PI, II xii, cf. Z, 350). It is doubtful that this is
enough to make grammar depend (whether causally or rationally) on the
world’s constitution, thereby making conceptual normativity derivative
upon how things are made and stand. But even if it were enough, that
would not bring necessity back into the world: even if our grammar where
somehow (causally or rationally) forced upon us by the nature of things,
that would not make such nature necessary. It would just mean that nature
imposes adequacy conditions upon the rules governing our representation
of it: it forces us to represent it in a certain way, if our representation is
to be adequate. 
When Wittgenstein talks about ‘nature’ or ‘reality’ in these contexts, he
is talking about the physical world. By contrast, if we were to have
Williamson say that philosophy is concerned with reality (which he doesn’t
say in so many words, so far as I recall), reality shouldn’t necessarily be
taken to coincide with the physical world. It would include numbers and
other logical and mathematical entities, as well as knowledge, truth, time,
and more.6 Though the issue would be open whether all that ultimately
reduces to physical objects and properties, it wouldn’t be a preliminary
issue: we can say that epistemology is about knowledge (not about the
concept of knowledge or the word ‘knowledge’) or that ethics is about the
good even without having preliminarily established that knowledge and
the good are physically respectable entities. It is not obvious that there
5 Amply discussed in Forster 2004. 
6 Hence it looks question-begging just to assert that ‘whatever knowledge log-
ic and mathematics yield, it is not ‘substantive knowledge of the world’’
(Hacker 2009, 346). On the other hand, as Glock rightly points out (p.341),
that mathematics and logic provide new knowledge about reality cannot just
be taken for granted either. Whether reality does or doesn’t include numbers,
truth, etc. is not the kind of issue that can plausibly be regarded as settled. 
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are only physically respectable entities. By contrast, for Wittgenstein
there is nothing but the physical world and our language with its rules: if
an investigation is not about the physical world, then it is about language
and its rules. Williamson, like the early Russell, appears to countenance -
at least prima facie- any entity whatsoever that we appear to be wondering
about. The questions we ask about them are to be taken literally, not
‘demythologised’, particularly if the demythologising suggestions are
inherently unconvincing. For as a matter of fact, they fail to discriminate
between allegedly conceptual questions and obviously non-conceptual
ones; indeed, the very idea of a conceptual inquiry yielding conceptual
truths looks suspicious, as the best explication of the notion of a concep-
tual truth, i.e. analytic truth, is not really viable in any of its versions.
About this pars destruens of Williamson’s view I will not, however, take
stand here. 
Wittgenstein and Williamson do not seem to disagree about what the
philosophical problems are. Williamson believes that such problems can
in principle be solved: they are questions that one can think of answering.
In many cases -perhaps in every case- the answer is going to be a neces-
sarily true proposition that is really about what it appears to be about,
i.e. some aspects of reality: physical objects and properties such as the
planet Mars and dryness, or entities -non-physical properties?- such as
knowledge and truth.7 By contrast, for Wittgenstein the genuinely philo-
sophical problems -those that are not empirical problems in disguise- are
to be dissolved: we are to show that they are not about what they seem to
be about, i.e. physical objects and properties or metaphysical objects and
properties (so they are not the problems they seem to be). It is sometimes
possible to show that philosophical questions misleadingly hint at certain
conceptual connections, i.e. at certain features of our use of language. The
thing to be done in such cases is to recall to mind such features as are
implicit in our use of language (itself open to our inspection). The
answer to the philosophical question will then consist in pointing to a
7 When this substantialistic view of philosophical truths is extended to ex-
treme cases (e.g. when it is claimed that the statement that everything is i-
dentical with itself describes ‘an obvious trait of everything’ (Quine 1954),
or ‘a general feature of the way the world is’ (Harman 1968)), Wittgensteini-
ans are outraged; but it doesn’t look very effective to reply that such formula-
tions involve a misuse of language, for we do not use ‘trait’ or ‘feature’ for u-
niversal attributes (Schroeder 2009, 96). The Wittgensteinian point here is
not that there are no universal features (why not?), but that ‘This is not iden-
tical with itself’ is nonsense.
rule, e.g. to the rule for the application of the concepts of knowledge and
truth. 
Wittgenstein’s view is based on his reductionist conception of necessity.
I am not claiming that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy straight-
forwardly follows from his rejection of necessity-in-the-world;8 clearly,
however, if one is persuaded that there are no necessarily true (or necessar-
ily false) propositions, one will hardly maintain that questions such as
‘What is knowledge?’ are partly answered by stating a necessary connection
between knowledge and truth. Hence, it would be natural to argue against
Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as conceptual analysis by criticizing
its grounds, i.e. Wittgenstein’s conception of necessity. Williamson does-
n’t, because the Kripkean metaphysics of necessity and the idea of a poste-
riori necessity are part of the theoretical background he is taking for
granted.9 There is of course nothing wrong in just assuming a philosophi-
cally respectable and widely shared conception of necessity: if on that
basis Williamson had refuted Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as con-
ceptual analysis, his overall argument would be on a par with
Wittgenstein’s argument (from the reduction of necessity to normativity
to the claim that philosophy is conceptual analysis). If on the other hand
Williamson had refuted Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophy is concep-
tual analysis on independent grounds, his argument would count as an
indirect refutation of Wittgenstein’s views on necessity. However,
Williamson has done neither, for the conceptual analysis claim he argues
against is not quite Wittgenstein’s claim (he could have tried to show
that Wittgenstein’s views reduce to the views he is arguing against, but,
again, he hasn’t). Moreover, it is not at all clear that Williamson’s refuta-
tion of the claims he does argue against is independent of Kripkean
assumptions about necessity.10 This is why I said that Williamson’s argu-
9Wittgenstein and Williamson on Conceptual Analysis
8 As Andrea Bianchi pointed out in discussion, Wittgenstein might have cho-
sen an eliminativist attitude towards necessity, like Quine’s. If he took up a
reductionist attitude instead, it must have been because he recognized the dis-
tinction between necessity and generality, though he believed that necessity
was misunderstood by metaphysics.
9 In Marconi 2010 I tried to show that the notion of a posteriori necessity
should still be regarded as more controversial than it is usually taken to be. 
10 For example, his crucial conclusion that modal-analytic truths are not thereby
‘insubstantial’ rests upon the possibility that they might express ‘profound
metaphysical necessit[ies] about the nature of the world’; an example of a
modal-analytic truth that expresses a necessity about the nature of the world
is the familiar ‘Water is H2O’.
ments have no great bite against Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy,
which is, after all, the most eminent member of the family Williamson
would like to exile, as their views ‘are unbacked by any argument that has
withstood the test of recent time’ (PoP, 19). 
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